More than a hundred thousand grassroots-mobilised peaceful protesters, coming out on the streets of Georgian cities for the last month, holding pro-democratic banners, expressing disagreement with the course the ruling party has taken, and dancing in the streets while being dispersed by water cannons and tear gas, is a historical statement. Nationwide solidarity has opened flats to host protesters coming from the regions, prompted pharmacies to give out face masks and medical equipment for free, the bus drivers to strike, individuals to bring food and drinks to the protesters, cafes to open their doors to anyone, mums to create mini-groups of children to free up other mums. This open spirit and determination is contagious – it is a collective force that no Georgian government so far has managed to supress.
Increasing government violence against the very same peaceful civil protesters in Tbilisi is, however, a move emboldened by Russia. Indirectly, this violence is enabled by the EU’s weakness in pursuing its enlargement project and in facing Russian interference in candidate countries. In addition to pepper spray, water cannons and rubber bullets, last night the ruling party deployed ‘titushki’ – gangs of regime thugs in civilian clothes who were attacking peaceful protesters on the streets, resulting in more injuries.
Beyond statementsof great concern, it is time for the EU’s political leaders to show up in Georgia, still in May 2024, and take concrete measures. Georgian people with bare hands in front of heavily-equipped special forces need support – they are standing against Russia and its cronies.
Georgia’s ruling party has completed two out of three readings of a law on ‘foreign influence’, which would expose NGOs, media and opposition groups to penalties for receiving donations from abroad. It has also adopted a law enabling transfers of laundered offshore wealth into Georgia without taxation. Both laws – and the related violence and intimidation – aim at consolidating the power of the Russia-friendly ruling party, ‘Georgian Dream’, which is significantly raising the stakes ahead of October’s parliamentary elections.
On 29 April, the party’s founder and honorary chairman, multi-billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, openly declared an intention to punish the opposition after the elections. As Ukraine is struggling to prevent the collapse of its frontline while waiting for a re-supply of arms and ammunition, ‘Georgian Dream’ is set to complete an authoritarian regime that it has been gradually building since its electoral victory in 2012.
In order to tackle vote-buying, intimidation, disinformation and other forms of electoral manipulation that ‘Georgian Dream’ amply tested in 2020, the EU should organise a (pre)election monitoring mission of unprecedented scale for autumn 2024. But Georgia’s democratic and European future is at stake already now, in the spring.
The third parliamentary reading of the law on ‘foreign influence’ is scheduled for 17 May. EU institutions have denounced the law as going against Georgia’s stated ambition to progress towards the start of EU accession negotiations. EU, US and UK Ambassadors and senior officials have been conveying their concern and criticism to the government ever since the law on ‘foreign influence’ was re-tabled in early April. But so far no high-level politician from the EU has come to Georgia to support the widespread civic protests. So far, there is no sign of ‘Georgian Dream’ backing down and dropping the law, as it did after popular protests against the initial draft law in March 2023.
When Ursula von der Leyen issued a statement on 1 May, “condemn[ing] the violence in the streets of Tbilisi,” pro-government media promptly interpreted it as a condemnation of the protesters, not of heavily armed police that has beaten up dozens of people.
So what should the EU do about Georgia – still in May 2024 – if the EU is serious about its enlargement policy, if it cares to uphold democracy in Georgia, and if it has drawn lessons from Belarus’ rigged election of 2020 and the de facto Russian takeover that followed?
Some members of the European Council and/or HRVP Borrell should visit Georgia by mid-May and clearly stand with the protesters, affirming the position expressed by the EU through published statements.
The European Commission should suspend all budget support to Georgia and financing of government-led projects, until the ‘foreign influence’ law is dropped and fair elections are held in October. The suspension and the possibility of resuming EU support should be clearly communicated. In parallel, the EU could explore other ways of supporting the Georgian society.
The HRVP and the Commission should heed, at long last, the repeated plea of the European Parliament, and propose targeted financial sanctions and travel bans against the leadership of ‘Georgian Dream’ and their families, unless the ‘foreign influence’ law is dropped and fair elections are held. Imposing sanctions would be an unorthodox step vis-à-vis the ruling party of an EU candidate country, but the EU’s longstanding tactic of trying to persuade the ruling party without antagonising it, has clearly proven ineffective.
The European Commission and Parliament will be undergoing their periodic renewal between June and November. However, the institutional transition cannot paralyse the EU’s external action for half a year. Just as Russia will not take a break from attacking Ukraine before the new College of Commissioners takes office, the EU must be able to take relevant steps towards its candidate countries while it matters.
Active EU engagement with Georgia at this breaking point is in the EU’s own interest. EU enlargement is neither a charity project, nor a school exam. It is a common effort of the EU and of the candidate countries to resist Russia’s determined work to dismantle the EU through a mix of military aggression, sponsorship of far-right nationalists, and disinformation. The collapse of democracy in Georgia would not just be a testimony to the EU’s weakness, but also a blow to the EU’s security, strengthening the Russia-Iran interconnection and giving Russia and China control over connectivity through the South Caucasus.
The EU should have learned by now, from Russia’s response to the 2013-14 Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine, from the 2020 ‘elections’ in Belarus and from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, that wait-and-see is not an approach that bears fruit in the long run. Eastern Neighbours need support at the time when Russia is grabbing power (and territory), not months later.
A tragic scenario can also be envisaged in Georgia, whereby rigged elections in October would lead to massive public protests, which would be then suppressed by Russian armed forces, helping the incumbent government stay in power. The EU – and Georgia’s pro-European population – obviously need to avoid such an outcome. However, the EU can still take meaningful steps to support Georgian democracy (including through sanctions and/or the suspension of financing for government-led projects) while acknowledging that behind the ‘Georgian Dream’ stands Russia, with all of its military and hybrid war tools.
In the meantime, Bidzina Ivanishvili still declares to his supporters that “Georgia is a clear leader among the candidate countries for membership in the European Union in terms of democracy, human rights, strength of institutions, and the infrequency of corruption.” Skipping over the numerous conditions and criticisms formulated by the EU, he promises EU membership by 2030. It is with this double-speak that ‘Georgian Dream’ has gradually taken over state institutions and aligned Georgia’s foreign policy with Russia’s. The EU should not become complicit by lending plausibility to the ruling party’s narrative.
As one Georgian political scientist put it recently, “we only have days left to save Georgia. Maybe weeks. But not months.”
Co-funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Education and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA). Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.
What can the EU do about the Georgian government’s drift towards Russia?
More than a hundred thousand grassroots-mobilised peaceful protesters, coming out on the streets of Georgian cities for the last month, holding pro-democratic banners, expressing disagreement with the course the ruling party has taken, and dancing in the streets while being dispersed by water cannons and tear gas, is a historical statement. Nationwide solidarity has opened flats to host protesters coming from the regions, prompted pharmacies to give out face masks and medical equipment for free, the bus drivers to strike, individuals to bring food and drinks to the protesters, cafes to open their doors to anyone, mums to create mini-groups of children to free up other mums. This open spirit and determination is contagious – it is a collective force that no Georgian government so far has managed to supress.
Increasing government violence against the very same peaceful civil protesters in Tbilisi is, however, a move emboldened by Russia. Indirectly, this violence is enabled by the EU’s weakness in pursuing its enlargement project and in facing Russian interference in candidate countries. In addition to pepper spray, water cannons and rubber bullets, last night the ruling party deployed ‘titushki’ – gangs of regime thugs in civilian clothes who were attacking peaceful protesters on the streets, resulting in more injuries.
Beyond statements of great concern, it is time for the EU’s political leaders to show up in Georgia, still in May 2024, and take concrete measures. Georgian people with bare hands in front of heavily-equipped special forces need support – they are standing against Russia and its cronies.
Georgia’s ruling party has completed two out of three readings of a law on ‘foreign influence’, which would expose NGOs, media and opposition groups to penalties for receiving donations from abroad. It has also adopted a law enabling transfers of laundered offshore wealth into Georgia without taxation. Both laws – and the related violence and intimidation – aim at consolidating the power of the Russia-friendly ruling party, ‘Georgian Dream’, which is significantly raising the stakes ahead of October’s parliamentary elections.
On 29 April, the party’s founder and honorary chairman, multi-billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, openly declared an intention to punish the opposition after the elections. As Ukraine is struggling to prevent the collapse of its frontline while waiting for a re-supply of arms and ammunition, ‘Georgian Dream’ is set to complete an authoritarian regime that it has been gradually building since its electoral victory in 2012.
In order to tackle vote-buying, intimidation, disinformation and other forms of electoral manipulation that ‘Georgian Dream’ amply tested in 2020, the EU should organise a (pre)election monitoring mission of unprecedented scale for autumn 2024. But Georgia’s democratic and European future is at stake already now, in the spring.
The third parliamentary reading of the law on ‘foreign influence’ is scheduled for 17 May. EU institutions have denounced the law as going against Georgia’s stated ambition to progress towards the start of EU accession negotiations. EU, US and UK Ambassadors and senior officials have been conveying their concern and criticism to the government ever since the law on ‘foreign influence’ was re-tabled in early April. But so far no high-level politician from the EU has come to Georgia to support the widespread civic protests. So far, there is no sign of ‘Georgian Dream’ backing down and dropping the law, as it did after popular protests against the initial draft law in March 2023.
When Ursula von der Leyen issued a statement on 1 May, “condemn[ing] the violence in the streets of Tbilisi,” pro-government media promptly interpreted it as a condemnation of the protesters, not of heavily armed police that has beaten up dozens of people.
So what should the EU do about Georgia – still in May 2024 – if the EU is serious about its enlargement policy, if it cares to uphold democracy in Georgia, and if it has drawn lessons from Belarus’ rigged election of 2020 and the de facto Russian takeover that followed?
The European Commission and Parliament will be undergoing their periodic renewal between June and November. However, the institutional transition cannot paralyse the EU’s external action for half a year. Just as Russia will not take a break from attacking Ukraine before the new College of Commissioners takes office, the EU must be able to take relevant steps towards its candidate countries while it matters.
Active EU engagement with Georgia at this breaking point is in the EU’s own interest. EU enlargement is neither a charity project, nor a school exam. It is a common effort of the EU and of the candidate countries to resist Russia’s determined work to dismantle the EU through a mix of military aggression, sponsorship of far-right nationalists, and disinformation. The collapse of democracy in Georgia would not just be a testimony to the EU’s weakness, but also a blow to the EU’s security, strengthening the Russia-Iran interconnection and giving Russia and China control over connectivity through the South Caucasus.
The EU should have learned by now, from Russia’s response to the 2013-14 Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine, from the 2020 ‘elections’ in Belarus and from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, that wait-and-see is not an approach that bears fruit in the long run. Eastern Neighbours need support at the time when Russia is grabbing power (and territory), not months later.
A tragic scenario can also be envisaged in Georgia, whereby rigged elections in October would lead to massive public protests, which would be then suppressed by Russian armed forces, helping the incumbent government stay in power. The EU – and Georgia’s pro-European population – obviously need to avoid such an outcome. However, the EU can still take meaningful steps to support Georgian democracy (including through sanctions and/or the suspension of financing for government-led projects) while acknowledging that behind the ‘Georgian Dream’ stands Russia, with all of its military and hybrid war tools.
In the meantime, Bidzina Ivanishvili still declares to his supporters that “Georgia is a clear leader among the candidate countries for membership in the European Union in terms of democracy, human rights, strength of institutions, and the infrequency of corruption.” Skipping over the numerous conditions and criticisms formulated by the EU, he promises EU membership by 2030. It is with this double-speak that ‘Georgian Dream’ has gradually taken over state institutions and aligned Georgia’s foreign policy with Russia’s. The EU should not become complicit by lending plausibility to the ruling party’s narrative.
As one Georgian political scientist put it recently, “we only have days left to save Georgia. Maybe weeks. But not months.”
Cover Picture: Nino Pruidze
Co-funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Education and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA). Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.
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