Ukraine is on the path to join both the EU and NATO, while defending itself – and Europe – against Russia’s brutal aggression. It is essential for Ukraine’s future that the two accession processes proceed hand in hand, complementing each other. EU-NATO complementarity is needed to provide Ukraine with credible security guarantees, strong international support to reconstruction as well as a well-functioning judiciary and the rule of law.
Complementarity has been a much-used concept to characterise the division of roles between the European Union (EU) and The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in securing Europe. There are three important aspects of EU-NATO complementarity with regard to Western support to Ukraine.
NATO security guarantees
First, when it comes to security guarantees, a core division of tasks between the EU and NATO remains: NATO is the only organisation capable of providing credible security guarantees and taking care of collective defence of its members. This is why it was so important for Ukraine to receive a clear promise of future NATO membership at the Vilnius Summit in July this year. The indispensable role of NATO for European security has been underscored by the return of full-scale war to Europe. NATO is focusing again on its historical core task of collective defence, to be extended to Ukraine in future.
Interestingly, France – being the strongest advocate of EU defence – turned favourable to providing Ukraine with a clear path to NATO membership ahead of the Vilnius Summit. While the United States of America and Germany remained more hesitant, France seemed to adopt the understanding shared by Central and Eastern European countries that NATO membership is the most efficient way to provide Ukraine with credible security guarantees. Paris might also be keen to see Ukraine’s prospect of joining NATO to take off some pressure to advance quickly with EU enlargement.
At the same time, Russia’s war against Ukraine has ushered in a qualitative change and significant strengthening of the EU’s contribution not only to non-military aspects of security and external crisis management, but also to hard security and military defence of the EU as well as Ukraine. The EU has crossed many self-defined red lines by clearly choosing its side in a war between two of its neighbours and providing military support to a country at war, which amounted to EUR 20 billion during the first 18 months of the full-scale invasion.[1] Furthermore, the EU has launched joint procurement in order to enhance deliveries of much needed ammunition to Ukraine.
It is noteworthy that, during the first year of the full-scale war, Ukraine felt disappointed at NATO’s limited role and positively surprised by the EU’s contribution to its war effort. The EU has an important role to play in revived efforts to strengthen and streamline European defence capabilities, which are needed for both supporting Ukraine during the war and strengthening NATO’s defence and deterrence in the long term.
Gigantic task of reconstruction
Second, both the EU and NATO have an indispensable role to play in supporting Ukraine’s reconstruction. Security guarantees provided by NATO membership will be essential for making the country an attractive destination for foreign investors and bringing refugees back home. This is hugely important because public funding alone will not be sufficient for covering the huge costs of reconstruction, which are estimated to be EUR 383 billion only for the first year of the full-scale war.[2]
At the same time, a credible path to EU membership will complement NATO security guarantees by strengthening other elements of a favourable economic and business environment such as the rule of law and integration to the EU’s single market. There are studies indicating that EU accession increases foreign direct investment by 60%, while accession to the EU’s single market also has a positive although less significant impact on investment.[3]
It is also worth noting that, no matter how fast EU enlargement to Ukraine will proceed, the EU will have a major role and burden in supporting the reconstruction. NATO membership will lower the costs by reducing security-related risks and making it easier to involve private funds.
EU conditionality for the rule of law
Third, EU-NATO complementarity offers the most efficient way to address concerns about Ukraine’s corruption and weakness of the judiciary. One of the difficult issues at the Vilnius Summit was whether Ukraine should go through a Membership Action Plan before joining the alliance. At the infamous NATO Bucharest Summit in 2008, Ukraine (and Georgia) were declared future members, but were refused a Membership Action Plan (MAP), which was a prerequisite for accession. Hence, Moscow received a signal that NATO was not actually taking any steps towards membership of Ukraine and Georgia, and so there was an opening for Russia to try to restore its sphere of influence in the two countries.
In Vilnius this summer, it was decided after difficult debates that Ukraine would not need a MAP. Having the most combat-experienced and one of the most capable armies in Europe, which is going through a fast process of adopting NATO standards and developing interoperability with the alliance, Ukraine is getting prepared for membership in its own dramatic way.
Concern about corruption and weakness of the rule of law were presented by some voices in NATO debates as an argument for keeping the MAP’s requirement. However, judiciary reform and the fight against corruption are a high priority in the EU accession process, and the EU (unlike NATO) has developed strong conditionality mechanisms to monitor and support such reforms in candidate countries. There is no need for NATO to double these efforts.
To conclude, Russia’s war against Ukraine has reshaped but also clarified the division of labour between the EU and NATO, the two main pillars of European security. Achieving a sustainable peace in Ukraine requires a clear path to membership in both organisations, each following their own conditions and logic. NATO should aim at a fast-track accession once the fighting stops. The EU, due to its more complex nature and a comprehensive set of membership conditions, cannot offer a fast track accession but needs to move steadily towards Ukraine’s full membership. NATO will provide Ukraine with existential security guarantees, which will enable the country to develop and prosper as a future Member State of the EU.
[1] European Union, EU assistance to Ukraine (europa.eu), accessed 13 September 2023.
[2] Sascha E. Ostanina, “Winning the Peace in Ukraine: Stimulating private investment for Ukraine’s reconstruction”, Policy Brief, Jacques Delors Centre, 14 July 2023.
[3] Nauro Campos, Saul Estrin, Randolph Bruno, “Foreign investment, European integration, and the Single Market”, Centre for Economic Policy Research, 17 July 2021.
