In the wake of the rigged 2020 presidential elections in Belarus and subsequent mass protests, this Brief examines the challenges faced by Belarusian diaspora communities and their efforts to maintain activism abroad. It delves into the structure and goals of the Belarusian opposition, addressing key issues like passports, sanctions, and relations with Ukraine. The Brief eventually underscores four key factors in shaping the future of the Belarusian opposition.
Introduction
The rigged presidential elections in Belarus in 2020 caused unprecedented mass demonstrations all over the country. After security forces brutally suppressed the protests, tens of thousands of people left the country in order to avoid persecution, imprisonment and torture. As of today, 1489 persons are imprisoned in Belarus for political reasons. Abroad, a lively Belarusian democratic opposition has evolved under the leadership of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. Although the democratic opposition receives much international support, diaspora communities face diverse challenges in different countries.
This Policy Brief first gives an overview of the situation of Belarusian diaspora members in general and their resettlement in other countries. They face legal, economic and psychological difficulties while trying to uphold their activism and careers. The Policy Brief then focuses on the democratic opposition and its structure, goals and challenges. It will touch upon current issues such as the challenges faced obtaining a passport, sanctions against the Belarusian regime and the relation to Ukraine. It concludes by stressing four aspects that are vital for the future of the Belarusian opposition.
Current difficulties of the Belarusian diaspora
While receiving more international attention since 2020, Belarusian diaspora communities existed long before, having evolved since the First World War. When Lukashenka started turning the country into a dictatorship after coming to power in 1994, this again drove tens of thousands of people to leave the country. However, the emigration wave after 2020 was unprecedented, with numbers ranging between 200,000 and 500,000 people who have since left Belarus. Within Europe, most Belarusians resettled in Lithuania, Ukraine, Poland, Georgia or Germany.
The challenges which Belarusians face in their respective host countries are manifold. Personal problems include (among others) psychological difficulties after resettling to a new country, financial problems, language barriers, and the fear of persecution by the Belarusian regime towards family members who remain in the country. These problems and fears exacerbated since the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine became a full-scale invasion in February 2022, in which the Belarusian regime is complicit as a collaborator. Since then, cases of discrimination against Belarusians in exile increased due to their ethnic origin and because they are being associated with the Lukashenka regime. Forms of discrimination include denial of housing or bank services (e.g. in Georgia) as well as verbal assaults on the internet and in person.
Experiences of discrimination also include administrative and legal issues. While European Union (EU) Member States generally support the Belarusian diaspora, they also became more cautious since the start of the full-blown invasion and Lukashenka’s involvement in it. It has become increasingly difficult for Belarusians to obtain residence and work permits in other countries. For example, Lithuanian authorities denied or even revoked permits of over 900 Belarusians after declaring them a potential threat to national security. Alongside with Russian citizens and other nationalities, Belarusians now have to fill in questionnaires in order to prove that they do not support the Russian war of aggression. One reason for this might be fear of potential infiltration by the Belarusian regime, especially in neighbouring countries in which a high number of Belarusians have resettled. The tension between Lithuania, Poland, Latvia and Belarus increased significantly after hundreds of Wagner troops had been stationed in Belarus and in some cases close to the border. Also, Lukashenka is again organizing transports of an elevated number of migrants from Africa and the Middle East to the Belarusian border to put further pressure on these countries. As a result, Poland, Latvia and Lithuania have fortified their military presence at the border and closed several border crossings to Belarus.
At the same time, Lukashenka’s decisions continuously give rise to difficulties for Belarusians in the diaspora: his recent announcement to stop issuing passports in Belarusian embassies around the world is directed against each Belarusian living abroad. Belarusians now have to return to Belarus to apply for a new passport where many face persecution and imprisonment. In the past, this practice was already widely used against listed Belarusian activists and opposition members but did not include all Belarusians. Different governments in Europe are now trying to find possible solutions and start issuing alternative passports, as has been already introduced by Lithuania and Poland for Belarusian citizens who already have a residence permit. While other countries such as Estonia support the initiative, they call for a general solution on the EU level. In parallel, the Belarusian opposition is working on a “New Belarus” passport that could replace the one issued by the Belarusian regime.
Consequently, thousands of Belarusians continue to live with the repercussions of the authoritarian Lukashenka regime. At the same time, the 2020 protests also provided a momentum for a new political mobilisation, as a result of which the Belarusian democratic opposition evolved.
The democratic Belarusian opposition
Leaders of the Belarusian opposition have succeeded to create government-like structures and relations over the past three years. After the rigged elections in 2020, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya founded the Coordination Council in Lithuania whose primary goals are the release of all political prisoners and a peaceful transfer of power in Belarus. The Council identifies as the sole representative body of the democratic Belarusian society and includes several working groups on economy, human rights, education, feminism and other topics. The core membership of the Council consists of 70 individuals who voted 7 members for the Presidium. As of today, three members of the Board are political prisoners in Belarus, the other members live in exile. The Belarusian opposition now runs more than 20 alternative embassies, consulates, or information centres for Belarusians abroad. The Council works closely together with the National Anti-Crisis Managemen, also founded in 2020, which works on the administrative details of a transfer of power. In August 2022, Tsikhanouskaya announced the formation of the United Transitional Cabinet (UTC) as an official transitional interim government. The Coordination Council will consequently be transformed into a representative body.
Relations with the EU
At the EU level, the Belarusian opposition is continuously and successfully campaigning for its interests and goals while the relations between the Belarusian regime and the EU are reduced to a minimum. Since the rigged elections in 2020, and especially since the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine escalated in February 2022, the EU has issued six sanction packages against the regime, its members and supportive companies. The sanctions, for which the Belarusian opposition continuously lobbies in Brussels, include export bans, the exclusion of five Belarusian banks from the SWIFT system and limitation of financial flows. The Council of Europe suspended all relations with Belarus in March 2022. The European Parliament recently recognized Lukashenka as an accomplice to the crimes of President Putin, as in the case of the deportation of over 2000 Ukrainian children to Belarus. It hence calls for the International Criminal Court to issue an arrest warrant against Lukashenka and urges the EU to apply the same sanctions against the Belarusian regime as against Russia.
Towards the Belarusian opposition, the EU steadily intensified its support both rhetorically and financially. In 2022, over EUR 30 million were allocated to the Belarusian people in various EU programmes. As a sign of “the EU’s continued solidarity and continued commitment to the people of Belarus”, the new assistance programme ‘EU4Belarus: Supporting societal resilience and human capital development’ supports civil society actors as well as students, scholars and other professionals financially. In June 2023, High Representative Josep Borrell launched a Consultative Group between the EU and the Belarusian democratic opposition. As a platform for dialogue, the Group will share information on the situation in Belarus and support the EU in shaping future actions towards Belarus. The European People’s Party recently demanded to admit representatives of the Belarusian opposition to international organisations from which the Lukashenka regime was expelled. This would further strengthen and legitimise the position of the Belarusian opposition internationally.
Challenges of the Belarusian democratic opposition
Although the Belarusian opposition succeeded to ensure continuous international support for the Belarusian democratic struggle, it faces diverse internal and external challenges. The most obvious problem is the shift of public focus since the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine started and hence led to decreased attention towards Belarus, as shown in the case of legal residencies above.
Within the Belarusian community in Belarus and abroad, the legitimacy of the UTC and Coordination Council is being challenged since their mandate is not based on democratic elections. In addition, they face criticism for their lack of ideas concerning the future of the democratic opposition. With its decreasing influence and presence inside Belarus, both institutions have no real means of putting pressure on the Belarusian regime.
Another challenge which is related to the issue of legitimacy is the geopolitical position of the Belarusian opposition. At the beginning of August 2023, the opposition adopted a “Declaration of the future membership of Belarus in the EU” to officially advocate for a Belarusian accession to the EU and withdrawal from all connections with Russia. On the one hand, it seems remarkable that the Belarusian opposition only now takes an official position in this matter. On the other hand, Tsikhanouskaya aims to represent the whole Belarusian people, and it is not clear if a majority of the Belarusian public would support a pro-EU course if it came to a transfer or power. Recent polls by Chatham House suggest that an average of 67% of Belarusians would rather join a union with Russia, compared to an average of 46% favouring the EU.
The uncertain position of the Belarusian opposition also restricts its relationship with Ukraine. Despite their common struggle against Russian oppression, relations between the opposition bodies and the Ukrainian government remain limited. On the first day of the full-blown invasion, Tsikhanouskaya openly positioned herself against the Russian war of aggression and has called upon Belarusians in and outside Belarus to join anti-war actions, including the destruction of Russian military equipment stationed in Belarus. Still, the Ukrainian government avoided to officially support the Belarusian democratic opposition because they exert “neither an organization nor an intellectual influence on Belarusian society”. Ukrainian authorities’ reluctance to work with the Belarusian opposition seems to be based on the perception that the UTC is in no position to actively help Ukraine in its struggle. Another reason is caution on the Ukrainian side to not provoke Lukashenka to take a more active role in the war. With Lukashenka’s sovereignty diminishing and Putin’s tight grip on Belarus, the fates of the Belarusian and Ukrainian people are inextricably linked.
Conclusion
As this overview on the current state of the Belarusian opposition and the diaspora has shown, the future development of the Belarusian democratic struggle very much depends on four separate but interconnected aspects: (1) The Belarusian diaspora communities rely on continuous support by the governments and administrations of their host countries. The latter should become more open and flexible in issuing residency and visa permits to Belarusian citizens. (2) The Belarusian opposition needs to find new strategies not to lose touch with its own citizens still residing in Belarus and hence strengthen its own legitimacy. A positive development in this regard could also benefit the opposition’s relation with the Ukrainian government, which leads to (3) The future of the Belarusian democratic struggle strongly depends on the defeat of Russia in Ukraine which could provide a new momentum for a transfer of power in Belarus. In this regard and as a last important aspect, (4) the EU as a strong supporter of both Ukraine and the Belarusian democratic opposition has a responsibility to continue this support and expand its pressure on the Belarusian regime. Next steps should include the preparation of alternative travel documents and enhanced plans for an alternative Belarusian passport.
