The use of the European Peace Facility (EPF) to support Ukraine has changed its broader framing within the EU. The joint financing and risk sharing has encouraged national decision makers to open stocks of defence material and enabled a level of European ownership for the Ukraine-aid. Breaking of taboos catalyses questions regarding the EU’s security partnerships beyond Ukraine.
‘I would propose to create a new European Peace Facility, financed and managed together with our Member States. This would allow to be much more efficient in planning and deploying our military missions, but also to support our partners in dealing with our shared security challenges’ (Mogherini, 2017).
Since it was first initiated by the former High Representative Federica Moghereni in December 2017, the European Peace Facility (EPF) has come a long way. Once an initiative that received considerable criticism for its feared militarising effect and its risks in fragile states and conflict situations, the facility has lately become the flagship of the EU’s common support to Ukraine’s defence against Russia’s invasion. Thus far, €4,6 billion of military support has been allocated to the Ukrainian armed forces and the EU’s training mission in Ukraine, including varying military equipment and platforms and ammunition. The EU’s decision to finance lethal materiel to a partner for the first time in history was reached in a process noteworthy of its speed.
nly a few days after the start of the full-scale invasion.
Because of the major need, the total budget ceiling for the instrument has been increased from €5 billion to €7.9 billion for 2021–2027 and will likely be further pumped up in order to continue the support to Ukraine whilst keeping the instrument’s global outreach intact. As decisions on lethal aid to be financed to other partners are expected to be taken soon, the use of the full potential of the off-budget instrument will move from the phase of breaking taboos to a phase of establishing new means within the EU’s CSDP tools and its global agency.
This Briefing paper examines the evolving meaning and framing of the EPF and reflects the broader implications of the tool and its use for the EU’s foreign and security policy agency. It argues that the war in Ukraine and the usefulness of the EPF in that context strengthen the geopolitical reasoning within the EU’s foreign and security policy efforts. As regards to the EPF, the war seems to have stripped the need to frame the instrument first and foremost as a conflict prevention and peace building tool and instead legitimised the rationale of using the EPF more explicitly as a military tool securing and defending the interests of the EU and its partners. This can be seen as a continuation of a considerably longer process of trying to enhance the EU’s security capabilities aside its civilian power instruments.
After a short introduction to the background and evolution of the EPF, the paper discusses the use of the EPF in the context of Ukraine and what this means for the EU’s foreign and security policy agency more broadly.
Finally, the brief identifies key takeaways regarding the future use of the EPF and security partnerships in general.
Background of the EPF
he EU’s security policy update for this decade, the Strategic Compass, aims to address one key shortage – the EU’s limited ability to independently act in conflict and crisis situations and to adequately respond to security needs, including those of its partners. In theory, the capability gap just reflects the long-term division of labour between the NATO and the Union. In practise, the division of labour has led to some embarrassing situations in the EU’s international partnerships, such as when EU-trained troops might need to have turned to other donors in order to obtain the equipment needed during training and to use the skills they had been trained in.
For the civilian power EU any step towards military agency has been sensitive to take and has also required overcoming legal barriers such as that the EU budget cannot be used for operations with a military element. In 2004, the African Peace Facility and the Athena Mechanism were established, the former funding peace support operations and building capacities on the African continent specifically and the latter financing EU operations with a military element.
Neither of these instruments accommodated lethal materiel to support third parties and they lacked a global outreach as regards material assistance measures for the EU’s partners. In late 2017, the Instrument for Stability and Peace, the EU’s main budgetary instrument in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, was modified to accommodate ‘Capacity Building in Support of Security and Development’, which in practice meant non-lethal capacity building support to military actors in partner countries. This step was motivated by the experienced shortcomings of the EU’s capacity building support and the emphasis on the security-development nexus.
Adopted in March 2021, the EPF has arguably made the train and equip pursuit within the Union considerably more concrete than the previous attempts and instruments. The EPF streamlined the financial framework for funding military operations by replacing both the Athena mechanism and the African Peace Facility and expanded their scope both geographically and in consideration of the nature of the equipment available to partners. Notably, when first introduced and negotiated about, the justifications for establishing a new instrument repeated the familiar language about strengthening the EU’s contribution to conflict prevention and peace building abroad. The peace building community, however, vocally criticised the EU for establishing a military equipping instrument without considering the risks involved.
In the spring 2023, the EPF has been functioning for more than two years. It has two pillars, one for the funding of EU military operations and another for assistance measures for capacity building. The EPF has already been used in more than 15 countries, among others to support Georgian and Moldovan armed forces, Rwandan defence forces in Mozambique and several peace support operations in Africa, only Ukraine obtaining lethal material thus far.
Implications of the current use of the EPF to support Ukraine are not, however, limited to the lethal materiel per se, neither to Ukraine only.
Four implications of using the EPF in war-time Europe
We identify four effects of using the EPF as part of the European response to Russia’s war in Ukraine:
Firstly, coordinating and funding eight aid packages jointly (three Member States constructively abstaining from the decisions) has served as a way to build a EU’s unified response in a context where Russia would prefer to see Member States fragmented and acting alone. Despite Hungary’s recent veto, at a larger scale, the joint action has built confidence in the continuing of a coherent support to Ukraine from EU partners, sending a signal to both Ukrainian and Russian strategists. Joint action has also served as a safeguard, not least when facing the risk of Russia’s countermoves to aid decisions.
Secondly, the joint EPF decisions have served as a justification and an encouragement especially for those EU states that are hesitant to engage in a military conflict and send equipment to a war-zone due to strategic cultural, political or historic reasons. The risk of an escalation or misuse of the provided weapons has been to some extent transferred to the EU level, easing domestic decision-making. The aid-boosting effect of the joint action has been vital for Ukraine that needs extensive urgent support.
Thirdly, the use of the EPF has contributed to achieving a level of European ownership on the military support to Ukraine. While the EU certainly does not challenge the position of the US in showing the way in supporting Ukraine, the aid is not provided and coordinated only in the US’ guidance, since there is also a European instrument in place for this purpose. This is an achievement, considering past international crisis responses. The ownership provides an opportunity to build a European long-term strategy for Ukraine’s support. It should also facilitate critical analysis on the use of the instrument among European actors, based on European values and the EU approach to crises and conflicts.
Fourth, moving beyond the war, the use of the EPF during the past year seems to have influenced the EU’s global role more broadly, both as regards its internal perceptions as well as expectations towards it. Through the EPF and the use of all types of support to Ukraine, the EU is positioning itself as an actor beyond its traditional civilian, political and economic power.
Since it has broken the taboo of providing lethal support to partners, the Union is more likely to provide arms to partners also in other contexts. This is not least because of the expectations that its other partners facing security challenges of their own have towards the EU – after seeing the scale of support to Ukraine. This was evident in the HRVP Borrell’s remarks at the Schuman Security and Defence Forum, in which he acknowledged the questions raised and expectations among the EU’s other security partners towards the bloc’s new security and defence agenda and its provisions of lethal support to partners. The message conveyed was one of the EU standing ready to support its partners globally in an increasingly hostile and geopolitically competitive world. Yet, what does this imply for the EU’s foreign and security policy agency in broader sense and to what end is the EPF ultimately being promoted?
The EPF and the EU’s broader foreign and security policy agency
A word of caution first. The EPF’s gamechanger role should not be overstated based on its use in Ukraine and care is warranted also with regard to exaggerating its role in Ukraine. While the EPF has turned out to be one of the most useful tools to respond to the war and to develop the Union towards the direction defined in the Strategic Compass, it has not changed the European dependence on the US military support.
Military aid pledged to Ukraine by the United States totals up to €43,2 billion, EU countries altogether (including the EPF contributions) helping Ukraine with materiel worth €15 billion.
Analysts and scholars are pointing to the increasing need to develop European capability to produce defence material, foreseeing that the US might soon need its resources elsewhere. These expectations cannot be met through the EPF.
The next couple of years will give more indications on the concrete weight that the instrument has in the situations it is used (particularly regarding the equipment support pillar) and on the effects it has on the EU’s foreign and security policy posturing more generally. Yet, some early signs of evolving purposes and changing emphases can be detected based on the framing of the instrument and the surrounding rhetoric lately. These changes contribute to and have made more explicit the growing emphases on capacity building of security partners amid geopolitical considerations, at the expense of core conflict prevention tools.
Firstly, during the two years of the EPF in function, the rhetoric around the tool and the way it is framed have significantly changed. In the first EPF fact sheet from March 2021, the instrument was firmly and primarily tied to the objective of preventing conflicts and contributing to international peace and security. By 2023, the EPF fact sheet has forgotten about conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Instead, the instrument is now boldly framed in the context of the EU’s security and geopolitical aspirations in the ‘era for strategic competition’. The previously almost under-emphasised provision of ‘all types of’ equipment and materiel support has been lifted to the front of the story.
This shift in tone is repeated in speeches by the EU leadership, reflecting the interpretation that equipping Ukraine is also the best available strategy to prevent future military aggressions by Russia in Europe.
Beyond Ukraine, there is a clear(er) connection being drawn between the need for the EU to respond to the intensifying and threatening geopolitical competition and the EPF’s central role in it. This was evident in the first annual progress report on the Strategic Compass in which the EU’s response to Ukraine (including through the EPF) was deemed to have ‘strengthened the geopolitical posture’ of the EU, and where the EPF was highlighted in terms of its role in strengthening security partnerships. This changed framing of the EPF can, at least theoretically, give more leeway in justifying the use of the tool towards more geopolitically defined objectives and threats – whether or not coherent with the ideal course for action from a conflict preventive and peace building perspective.
Second, the increased focus on the EPF, security partnerships and geopolitical competition raises questions about the prevalence of and priorities within the EU’s broader, integrated approach to conflicts and crises. The EU’s added value continues to rely on a broad set of political, economic and security tools for peace building and conflict prevention. The early criticism towards the use of EPF in complex conflict situations has not lost its relevance. At worst, provisions of military equipment to security forces of a fragile state, for example, can facilitate violence against civilians and decrease rather than strengthen human security and other conditions for sustainable peace. The integrated approach to crises and conflicts cannot be replaced by solely equipping partner armies, even though the war in Ukraine shows that it can be complemented by the EPF.
Somewhat concerningly from this perspective, the EPF and the EU’s crisis responses more broadly appear to have lately become less connected to the integrated approach. For instance, unlike the original Strategic Compass document, the annual progress report does not even mention the integrated approach.
De-emphasising the integrated approach as a framework within which the EU takes comprehensive and sustainable action, including decisions on the use of the EPF, could risk conflict-insensitive and risky decisions on armed support that can ultimately harm the EU’s credibility as a security actor.
Thirdly, assuming that the EPF – and by extension the EU’s common security and defence policy (CSDP) – becomes increasingly tied to the EU’s and Member States’ geopolitical threat perceptions, will it work? In other words, can the EU increase its influence and credibility as a geopolitical player and diminish that of Russia’s and other competitors by the provision of more robust security support to its partners? The logic behind this expectation is that the EU’s loss of relative influence and credibility can be corrected by more straightforward and robust security presence that will reduce the space available for actors such as Russia. In short, if we are not there providing arms, they will be, and vice versa.
Yet, this argument does not consider that many global partners to the EU, for example in sub-Saharan Africa, do not see the current situation in either-or-terms as regards international partnerships. Instead of choosing permanently between partners, cooperation is rather considered on issue basis and according to the local (state actor’s) needs and priorities. Hence, the EU’s provisions of more robust military support can strengthen a partnership, if based on local needs (such as in Ukraine), but at the same time presence doesn’t automatically increase influence or decrease other actors’ influence. Moreover, the logic misses the point that at the core of the criticism towards the EU and its loss of credibility among the global south partners lies perceptions of inconsistent and double-standard foreign policy action by the EU, rather than any specific forms of instrument it applies.
This carries a deeper message for the EU’s and its Member States’ foreign and security policies, regarding and beyond the EPF.
Way forward with the EPF
Building on our short analysis, the way the EPF and its evolution will shape the EU’s agency will depend much on how rather than whether it will be used to provide more extensive military support, including lethal materiel, to EU’s partners around the world. The observed change in framing of the instrument offers some opportunities. The EPF is now talked about more straightforwardly as the instrument that it is, i.e., an instrument to provide all types of security support with military implications to the EU’s partners. The decreased level of double-talk could enable a more transparent and clear setting of objectives and priorities. These in turn are crucial for consistent use of the EPF that can also help the EU’s partners in adjusting their expectations towards it.
An important component here is clarity over the instrument’s red lines, general conditions and control mechanisms. The EPF’s current reference point for guidelines and principles for the assistance measures is the Integrated Methodological Framework, which sets proceedings for risk assessment and control. However, the framework lacks transparency as the full guidelines remains undisclosed and therefore out of scrutiny for independent observers and partners alike. This renders it difficult to assess what is actually done in order to minimise risks such as unintended proliferation of lethal material or the use of it in war crimes.
More broadly, for the EPF to be used in a measured and long-term strategic fashion, there needs to be scrutiny towards its risks as well as results and effects from different perspectives and regarding different objectives.
Whose security is improved through the assistance measures? Does the provision of non-lethal and lethal materiel to security forces being trained by the EU improve the impact of EU capacity building efforts from peace and stability perspective (as hoped for)? Does the provision of material support increase the EU’s geopolitical leverage, and if yes, under what conditions? Such questions can soon be studied empirically particularly vis-à-vis the provision of non-lethal assistance measures and their initial results.
Considering the lethal material support, there is a risk of the Ukraine-aid becoming a model example for how lethal materiel can be provided by the EU in any context. Ukraine’s need for arms has been particularly urgent and the justifications for it clear from the point of view of international law. Copying the aid process to other contexts – particularly if motivated by strengthening geopolitical posture – might pose a considerable risk from peace building and conflict preventive perspective, especially if the equipped partners suffer from lack of legitimacy among citizens or are party to multi-layered intrastate armed conflicts. In such contexts, the EU needs to be able to meet the growing responsibility that comes with the novel areas of agency.
Ultimately, the use of the EPF boils down to a question about the EU’s foreign policy identity, priorities and added value as an actor. The war has once again made salient the need for Europe to develop its security and defence capabilities. At the same time, the EPF has somewhat unexpectedly emerged as the totem of the EU’s agency within the war and helped the EU to respond to the security needs of its eastern partners better than before. Yet, for the EPF to support the EU’s and its Member States’ interests and security more long-term, the CSDP needs to be more clearly geared not only towards countering geopolitical rivals but to consistently build and defend the core values, interests and international order that the EU strives for.
