This Brief was finalised as of 11/07/2024
In June 2024, four major turnarounds took place within the European Union (EU) institutions, which may have consequences for both the work of the Union and the priorities of its future action: the appointment of the new European Council (EUCO) President, the Strategic Agenda 2024-2027, the European Parliament (EP) elections and the Hungarian Presidency of the Council. Since the Russian aggression, there has been a resurgence of EU enlargement policy, which has finally managed to regain momentum and prominence on the EU agenda. However, with such far-reaching makeovers, the risk is that enlargement enthusiasm may be wasted, if not hindered.
The topic of EU enlargement has enjoyed an unprecedented political momentum of revival, triggered by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Involved in this new ‘enlargement enthusiasm’ are not only the Accession Trio countries – Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – but also the Western Balkans countries, stuck in limbo of this process for more than a decade. In the December 2023 EUCO, leaders committed to expand to new members as a “geo-strategic investment in peace, security, stability and prosperity”, stating also that reforms within the EU must “be fit for the future”. Much progress has been made since; in the same month, the EUCO granted candidate status to Georgia, and agreed to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, which actually opened on June 25 with two intergovernmental conferences. But the path to reach both the accession of those states and an EU fit for 30+ members is still to be established.
However, the changes within the EU institutions over the last month – after the EP election results and consequent discussions on leadership changes across the EU institutions -, has raised the fear that such enlargement enthusiasm is threatened if someone less inclined to new admissions obtains the top jobs – with the risk of yet again disappointing the candidate countries’ expectations and their efforts to prepare for membership. Therefore, it is imperative to take stock of the state of play of the EU internal makeover and how this may affect future developments in EU enlargement.
Costa as the new EUCO President
Former Portuguese Prime Minister António Costa was elected as the new EUCO President on June 27, to replace Charles Michel as of December 2024. Since his time in government, Costa has always been openly supportive of further EU enlargement. During the December 2023 EUCO, he outspokenly backed EU accession negotiations both for Ukraine, promising that Portugal would “accompany the European Commission [toward opening negotiations] and support progress in Ukraine’s European integration process”, and for the Western Balkan countries, admitting that it is not possible to “disconnect the process of Ukraine’s enlargement to the EU” from that of the latter. In addition, he showed willingness to support internal EU reforms, stressing that “there is no EU enlargement without this implying changes to the European architecture [that] are absolutely essential so that expectations are not frustrated”.
Given the key power that the EUCO holds in both admitting new members and initiating treaty changes in the EU, having as President a figure who is willing to facilitate and direct cohesion and consensus in the EUCO toward the successful accomplishment of these goals is certainly an asset.
Strategic Agenda 2024-2029
On June 27, the new Strategic Agenda (SA) 2024-2029 was also released. The document devotes an entire section to enlargement, which states that the EU will “intensify its work to promote security, peace, stability and prosperity in its neighborhood.” The importance of this policy has been formally addressed and its new dynamism recognised. To this end, the EU will “support aspiring members in meeting accessibility criteria through appropriate instruments and use all possibilities to further advance gradual integration.” Similarly, the SA also stresses to “undertake the necessary internal reforms to ensure that [EU] policies are fit for” future accessions so as “the EU institutions [would] continue to function […] effectively.” For this reason, EU leaders endorsed a roadmap for future work on the EU’s internal reforms, which must progress alongside the new enlargement processes: only in this way will both the EU and the candidate members be effectively equipped when the time to become 30+ will come.
In contrast to the 2019 iteration, the inclusion of the enlargement in the SA implies that it is clearly considered one of the key issues and the preparation for new accessions is viewed as a top priority for the EU action in the next five years. Moreover, the fact that they explicitly referred to staged/phased solutions means that some sort of “gradual integration” can be assumed in the next five-year term.
European Parliament elections
The recent European Parliament (EP) election results showed a profound shift to the right in many member states, with populist radical right parties gaining several seats. 13 national far-right parties, including the French Rassemblement National, the Italian Lega and the Hungarian Fidesz, merged into ‘Patriots for Europe’, the new far-right bloc swallowing Identity and Democracy and becoming the third-biggest force in the EP, while Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland, cut off from the other far-right parties, launched its own group ‘Europe of Sovereign Nations’, the third coalition to the right but the most extreme of the three. The EP does not have extensive powers in foreign, security and defence policy – including, indeed, enlargement – which instead remain primarily in the hands of national governments. The Commission and the Council have the most strategic roles in the process of EU enlargement, as the former oversees the process and the latter shapes its direction. Nevertheless, the EP retains a pivotal one, as it monitors the progress of candidate countries and gives its assent to final accession before any treaty is ratified, as well as crafting legislations, shaping political debates and allocating financial resources. For this reason, the stronger presence of far-right and populist parties in the new EP could negatively influence the EU agenda for the next five years against enlargement, by opposing the design and the approval of the required legislation and funding. In addition, these parties have also consistently been averse to supporting EU institutional reforms (including qualified majority voting for sensitive areas) to favour EU enlargement, as they are viewed as undermining national sovereignty.
Despite this, the largest parties remained the European People’s Party (EPP) and Socialists & Democrats (S&D), which have always been pro-Ukraine and in favour of its path to EU membership. Among the right-wing parties, European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) joined the supportive parties, as opposed to Identity and Democracy. For this reason, the election results showed that the mainstream political families in the EP, who will therefore retain most of the agenda-setting power, remain a strong majority in favour of continuing EU enlargement policy. Therefore, it is likely that the EP will continue to support EU enlargement for the next five years. On the other hand, should ECR later decide to rebuke their support for Ukraine and merge into Patriots for Europe, this new far-right formation could outnumber S&D, thereby becoming the second group in the EP, right after the EPP, and genuinely creating an earthquake in the EP’s internal balance.
The Hungarian Presidency
Hungary will hold the Presidency of the Council of the European Union for the July-December semester. It has been a very difficult Member State on many issues, using and threatening to use its veto to block EU decision-making in many policies where it held a dissonant opinion. EU enlargement policy is one of them. Although the Council presidency trio – Spain, Belgium and Hungary – pledged to take enlargement forward, and indeed the Western Balkan countries’ accession has always been stated to be a major policy priority for the Hungarian Presidency, its stance on Ukraine has been very different. Hungary has consistently blocked EU sanctions on Russia, prevented military and financial aid for Ukraine, as well as limiting Kyiv’s EU aspirations. Until the very end, it was the only member who resisted opening negotiations with Ukraine – so much so that, to overcome Orban-imposed deadlocks on opening enlargement talks, he was politely asked to leave the room during a vote at the EUCO. The risk is that Hungary will block further progress on Ukraine’s accession, watering down efforts culminating in the recently opened negotiating talks – thus, at its most fragile moment.
The rotating Presidency has two highly relevant powers: ensure the smooth functioning of the EUCO proceedings (planning and chairing meetings and coordinating policy work) and building consensus among Member States. These tasks mean that the country in charge can have an impact on the EU agenda and thus influence its policies and politics. Having a country whose government is so openly opposed to new accession is in itself a risk to the momentum of enlargement policy. However, the institutional transition period in which this Presidency is placed, immediately after the EP elections and with very few EU institutions formally in place, may alleviate the otherwise worrisome scenario: it will take several months for the new EP and Commission to begin their work, which limits Hungary’s opportunities to concretely influence EU policies. Moreover, the screening process of the various political chapters of EU accession is expected to take well over six months. Thus, it is likely that Budapest will not have to chair over any vote on closing chapters concerning Kyiv’s negotiations, leaving the burden to the next EU Council President, Poland, in 2025. Yet, Hungary can still overall influence the Ukrainian negotiation process with public statements of condemnation toward it, which are loaded with more relevant gravity if who is declaring is chairing the EUCO. Moreover, Hungary is already in a position to undermine the enlargement agenda – even without the need for the Council Presidency: it can be done both directly through its vetoes in the EUCO and indirectly via the Commissioner for Enlargement, Olivér Várhelyi, one of Orbán’s close allies.
Policy recommendations
To regain credibility with the candidate countries, the new EU setup emerging from the EP elections will still have to show genuine willingness toward preparing for enlargement, both by supporting the candidates in the accession process and by committing itself to the necessary internal reforms.
This will require a thoughtful choice in the last remaining vacant role among the top jobs, but one that is also strategic for the enlargement policy: the European Commission President. The President must be able to send a clear signal that enlargement is one of the top priorities of their mandate already in the first inaugural speech, emphasising how this is a geopolitical necessity for Europe. In addition, their role proves to be key since they will select the next Commissioner for Enlargement – another appointment that must be carefully considered. Indeed, they must be capable of strengthening relations with the EU’s neighbours, providing a credible accession perspective, and supporting reforms in the nine candidate countries.
In view of the election results, the expectation is that the pro-accession groups will keep the future of enlargement policy high on their agenda when negotiating the profiles of the political leaders who will fill key positions in the Commission. The current party majority in the EP seems to be profiling a second term for von der Leyen, who has always stood supportive of welcoming new candidates to the EU since the full-scale attack by Russia against Ukraine and repeatedly stated that “enlargement is a vital policy for the European Union” – including toward the Western Balkan countries. However, it is necessary that this pro-enlargement attitude also be reflected in the choice of the Commissioner for Enlargement. Although Orbán wants to keep this job, the Commission President will indeed have to avoid such a scenario: the risk is that the Hungarian Prime Minister may somehow extend his longa manus over this mandate and thus negatively influence the negotiations. Efforts must be made to ensure that those nominated to EU top jobs do not waste the momentum created around enlargement once again.
