Jim’s Reading Corner is a reading list to stimulate debate in which our Secretary-General Jim Cloos analyses and reviews books of interest to Europe. From the unique perspective of a lifetime EU practitioner, Jim gives his comment on books, articles, long-reads, and more – and tackles the leading issues of the day. Today’s book is “Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of the post-Cold War Stalemate”, by M.E. Sarotte.

The title refers to a statement made by Jim Baker in a meeting in February 1990 with Gorbachev. It was in fact put as a hypothetical question: “What if you let your part of Germany go, and we agree that NATO will not shift one inch eastward to its present position?” Those who claim that there was a deal about this are wrong, of course. At the same time, this was one of the options seriously envisioned. In the end, because of the weakness of Russia and the errors of its leaders, but also because of intense lobbying both within the USA on the part of the neo-cons and by the  Central and Eastern European countries themselves. To the dismay of George Kennan, the expression progressively came to mean the exact opposite, i.e. that not one inch of  Central and Eastern Europe was to be left out of NATO and Article 5!

Sarotte tells the story of how all this unfolded, and the tale is gripping. She has consulted thousands of documents and talked to all of the key actors at the time.[1] She provides a balanced and fair assessment of what happened, the errors made on both sides and the opportunities missed, while laying out what could have happened differently on the major questions of the time: how to integrate Russia into the new word order, and how far , if at all, to stretch the boundaries of NATO membership into eastern Europe and the ex-Soviet republics. The book helps us better understand how we ended up with the present stalemate, and worse, with the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

I am struck by the way Sarotte’s describes the key role of Chancellor Kohl, doggedly pursuing the dream of his life and playing his cards skillfully. He had understood that a window of opportunity had opened and that it was key to clinching a deal before it was too late. He often called for “getting the harvest in before the perfect storm.” If there ever was a perfect illustration of Bismarck’s phrase about seizing opportunities that God or history offers to humans, here it is.[2] This stands in strong contrast to Gorbachev and Yeltsin who became tragic figures.

Sarotte compares the US policymaking as equivalent to a ratchet, where one move after the other takes the boat in the same direction:

• President Bush forecloses all options for a post-Cold War transatlantic security other than via an Atlantic Alliance capable of extending Article 5 beyond the Cold War line of demarcation.
• President Clinton forecloses his own administration’s option of incremental partnership as a means for that expansion (Partnership for Peace (PFP)).
• President Clinton forecloses any options that would have limited either the location or the number of new allies, or the pace at which they are added, or the benefits they enjoy.

All of this happens along three major stages: Harvest and Storm (1989-1992); Clearing (1993-1994); Frost (1995-1999).

A few key moments:

• Kohl’s 10-point program to forestall a Soviet ultimatum concerning NATO (November 1989).
• Early Bush decision that despite the Warsaw Pact breaking up, NATO must stay (“To hell with that”, i.e., Soviet anger.) And no de-nuclearization of a united Germany in NATO).
• The “Not one inch” intermezzo (9/02/90) between Baker and Gorbachev.
• Kohl’s visit to Moscow February 1990: “Germans themselves must now decide”, says Gorbachev in his meeting with Kohl, who immediately calls the press once the meeting ends and repeats this phrase!
• Internal divisions within Soviet government (Gorbachev versus Falin).
• July 1990: the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, a hand of friendship to former enemies, but rather empty in content.
• 3 October 1990: Germany reunited. Full NATO status. Option open for eastern Europeans who lobby hard. Comment by Strobe Talbott, closest advisor to Clinton on the USSR: “The USSR has conceded so much, and the US reciprocated so little.” (Time Magazine 1991) (before the entry into function of the Clinton administration)
• December 1990: massive Ukrainian vote for independence (84% participation, 90% for independence). Ukraine would be the trickiest part, more than the Baltic States. Nb: December 1991, the Belavezha agreement between Yeltsin, Kravchuk and Shushkevich), signaling the end of the USSR.
• The ‘Partnership for Peace ‘(PFP) initiative: a brilliant move by the Clinton administration; five advantages: avoid leaping straight into Article 5 territory; a response to the Yugoslav crisis; deepening relations with  Central and Eastern European countries; a place for Ukraine in the European security system/ averting the worst Russian reactions. (And overall putting NATO enlargement at the end of a manages process). It started off well but came under siege of the Washington forces (Vershbow, Fried, N. Burns, the neocons, Bruce Jackson[3] etc.) that wanted full membership now for the  Central and Eastern Europeans and even the Balts. Clinton soon abandoned his own initiative. Yeltsin’s erratic moves did not help either: he called for full equal status for Russia, for instance. And then came the first Chechen war…The December 1994 NAC turned into a venue for ramping up the full-guarantee expansion, initially for free frontrunners, but open-ended.
• The Budapest memorandum (in the margin of the OSCE in 1994): US, RU, and UK guarantee for security of territorial integrity of UA and other post-Soviet republics against ceding the nuclear weapons stationed on their territories.
• “Not one inch” now means that NATO will expand east with full Article five guarantees, and that Russia will have to satisfy itself with being ‘bought of ‘. Repeated criticisms and warnings by George Kennan against this line (NYT Op-ed on 5 February 1997 for instance)
• Kosovo crisis and NATO action.
• April 1999: Washington NATO summit which welcomes the Baltic States’ interest in joining NATO.
• End of 1999: enters Putin, first as Prime Minister, then President. A new stage begins.

Sarotte asks whether things could have gone a different way. Her answer is YES, IF:

• The idea of trading German unification against no NATO expansion east had not been dismissed out of hand.
• The name of NATO had been changed, as requested by Russia.
• There had been a pause in enlargement of NATO after 1999.
• The SE and FI suggestion for a Nordic Security Association had been examined more seriously.
• One had used precedents of differentiated NATO membership (See DK/NO, FR, ES, Eastern part of Germany).

We will of course never know for certain whether relations with Russia could have developed positively or whether they were doomed at the outset because of what Russia is. Sarotte’s book provides convincing and well-documented evidence that a positive approach was at least possible if the West had been more willing to compromise on some of Russia’s requests. It is not because Putin has now burnt all the bridges that there never was any chance of constructive relations with Russia. Kennan for one would argue that, had the West listened to his repeated warnings against too dogmatic an approach, the outcome may have been different.

Be that as it may, today, in the situation created by Putin, there is only one option: make sure that his Russia does not carry the day. His attack against the Ukraine has crossed a red line and cannot be accepted, even less so since the Russian government now openly transforms it into a crusade against the ‘degenerate’ West. The acceptance of Ukraine as a candidate for EU accession shows that the Europeans have sent an unmistakable message to Putin: “You have lost Ukraine and Ukraine will join our family.”  

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[1] 353 pages plus 146 pages of notes and a bibliography of 29 pages.

[2] „Man kann nur immer darauf achten, ob man den HerrGott durch die WeltGeschichte schreiten sieht, dann zuspringen und sich an seines Mantels Zipfel Klammern, dass man mit ihm fortgerissen wird, soweit es gehen soll.“

[3] Bruce Jackson, a figure from the military industrial complex, founder of the US Committee to Expand NATO. I saw him frequently when I was chef de cabinet of Jacques Santer between 1995 and 1999. At our first meeting (early 1995), he stunned me by showing me a detailed timeline for the expansion of ‘our’ Euro-Atlantic institutions (meaning NATO and the EU, in that order). It would turn out later that Jackson had been most accurate in this respect, including on the dates of enlargement!! Incidentally he already then started floating the idea of including SE and FI into NATO ‘to give it strategic depth’.